With the Pentagon’s spending plan to cut the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) budget by $1.2 billion and cancel longer-term programs of the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS), Congressional leaders and missile defense proponents have been on the attack front criticizing the Pentagon’s moves as reckless and harmful to national security. These groups of lawmakers and experts argue that the Obama administration’s budget request is an attempt to reduce government spending during a recession while shortchanging on America’s security. Representative Trent Franks (R-AZ) recently stated during a House Armed Services Committee (HASC) hearing on the Fiscal Year 2010 budget request: “I think that is incredibly the wrong direction to take this budget and our country on missile defense, given the growing threats that we face and given the growing attitude of other nations to have missile programs...”[1] Now, with North Korea’s recent provocative actions of conducting a nuclear test and launching short-range missiles off its coast, the spending debate is likely to get more heated over the next months as the budget goes through Congress.
All this poses an arduous task for senior Pentagon officials who have had to defend the FY10 missile defense budget request against those who believe increased funding for the BMDS is crucial at this juncture of U.S. national security. But so far, in the midst of all the criticism on the budget cuts, high ranking Pentagon leaders, which include Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen, have offered their own set of critical comments that focus on operational realities of systems instead of simply justifying the numbers. Without the political backdrop to distract or influence them, these officials have, in the process of defending the Pentagon’s budget request, expressed their views about the technological limitations, cost overruns, and flight test delays of elements of the BMDS that have been subject to termination or spending reductions. Their comments display an unprecedented level of candidness on BMDS programs never before seen in previous administrations.
In brief, the total budget request for missile defense is $9.3 billion DoD-wide, which is a cut of $1.6 billion from the FY09 appropriation level. This includes the MDA’s request of $7.8 billion and the funding requests for the Patriot Advanced Capability and the Medium Extended Air Defense System. Major MDA program cuts have been made to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and the Airborne Laser (ABL), with the GMD experiencing the largest cut under the MDA, and the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) programs have been terminated. Offsetting the cuts in the MDA programs are proposed funding increases that shift the focus to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, and the Standard Missile-3 programs. The budget cuts would essentially cut long-term programs, refocus R&D efforts on long-range capabilities, and focus more on rogue and theater missile threats for deployed forces and U.S. allies.
Missile defense proponents have slammed the Pentagon’s FY10 objectives, believing that it is dangerous to put long-range capabilities in the backburner. But Pentagon officials have spoken forthrightly about any potential threats and operational U.S. military capabilities to counter these threats in the near- and future-term. Following North Korea’s nuclear test and reports the rogue nation is preparing for a long-range missile test, Gates toured Fort Greely this week to inspect the GMD site in Alaska. (The GMD units deployed in California and Alaska are specifically designed to counter a North Korean threat). Upon his inspection of the missile defense complex, Gates said, “If there were a launch from a rogue state such as North Korea, I have good confidence that we would be able to deal with it.”[2] He reiterated that North Korea did not pose an imminent threat to the United States in order to justify the cuts made to the GMD program. At a congressional hearing on May 14, 2009, Gates told the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) that reducing the number of interceptors from 44 to 30 “does not mean [the DoD] will never go to 44 interceptors, or at least more than 30. It’s just that over the period of the next few years, [the DoD doesn’t] see the need to go to the additional interceptors, given the pace at which North Korea is developing its program.”[3]
Without question, Secretary Gates has been leading the charge against Congressional criticism. His candidness and honesty, yet practicality remains consistent with his views in recent weeks of programs that have been terminated in the FY10 budget request; and so far he has offered the most critical comments on the technical parameters and the operational viability of missile defense programs while being a supporter of missile defense “since President Reagan first announced his [Strategic Defense Initiative] in March of 1983.”[4] His views on missile defense spending are stated clearly in his statement made in response to Rep. Franks during the HASC hearing on May 13, 2009: “I would just say that the security of the American people and the efficacy of missile defense are not enhanced by continuing to put money into programs that…in terms of their operational concept are fatally flawed, or research programs that are essentially sinkholes for taxpayer dollars.”[5]
In addition to his comments on the GMD, Gates has been fairly straightforward about the flaws in the operational concepts, the acquisition and procurement processes, and schedule delays of the MKV, KEI, and the ABL. On the MKV, Gates has said that on top of technology and acquisition issues, the MKV was designed to handle complex threats that were on par with China and Russia’s advanced capabilities. But he told lawmakers during the HASC hearing that this would go against the missile defense plans of both the current and the previous administration to focus on rogue threats rather than missile threats from China and Russia. He reiterated his reasoning during the SASC hearing that “the Multiple Kill Vehicle, in addition to schedule and cost and technology issues, was designed against a far more capable enemy than North Korea or Iran [is] going to be for the next 10 to 15 years.”[6]
As for the KEI, which was a boost phase R&D program of the BMDS, Gates mentioned in a House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee hearing on May 20, 2009 that for the KEI to work, one would have to be fairly close to the rogue missile launch site. “The missile’s 38 or 39-feet long. It weighs 12 tons. There’s no extant ship that we can put it on… And as I say, it would have to operate in close proximity to the territorial waters of these countries.” Funding for the KEI had been reduced under the previous administration, and the five-year development program planned for the KEI had now turned into a 16-year development program, according to Gates.[7]
On the cancellation of the second ABL, Gates pointed out that it was also experiencing program delays and given the technical challenges, it questioned whether the ABL would ever be operational. “I don't know anybody at the Department of Defense…who thinks that this program should, or would, ever be operationally deployed. The reality is that you would need a laser something like 20 to 30 times more powerful than the chemical laser in the plane right now to be able to get any distance from the launch site to fire…And if you were to operationalize this you would be looking at 10 to 20 747s, at a billion and a half dollars apiece, and $100 million a year to operate,” Gates told members of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee. He added that “the operational concept…would have required…an orbit almost entirely within the borders” of a rogue nation which was “probably a little problematic.”[8]
Adm. Mullen expressed the same views on the ABL during the HASC hearing:
“I'd only say I've been in and out of missile defense since the mid-90s, and we've made a lot of progress on the near-term threats, where this investment goes. The challenges that we have in boost phase, specifically in boost phase, are enormous. I've felt ABL's been a flawed concept for years, quite frankly, because it made no sense, number sorties, and I think the investment there to get at the high energy laser, and that aspect of it, is really critical.”
General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, Director of the MDA, David Altwegg, Executive Director of the MDA, and Lt. Gen. Kevin Campbell, Head of the Army’s Space and Missile Command, are among the top voices of the Pentagon and the MDA who have also pointed out the shortcomings of missile defense programs. By taking a closer look at their justification for the budget cuts, their comments point to major flaws in systems that justify the decision to cut programs like the MKV and the KEI. It also suggests that decisions on funding missile defense weapons programs were not made merely to fit under an allocated defense budget.
Words from the Pentagon
General Cartwright: Pentagon News Briefing on the FY10 DoD Budget Request, April 6, 2009[9]
On ABL: “Clearly, there is great leverage in working in missile defense in the boost phase, because you catch it before you have the sophisticated threats or capabilities that might emerge...But we've got to figure out what the right way forward is, what the right balance is between the mid-course and the terminal. We've got now a good mid-course. We've got a good terminal capability. What do we need in the boost phase? What kind of attributes does it have for mobility and location, etcetera? Those are the things that we've got to understand before we go any further with the boost phase.”
“Well, the key attribute of ABL is that it's directed energy… But it is kind of at the rudimentary level of our understanding of directed energy…We need to…work on weight and power and cost, and work off the risks of that technology. It was our judgment that this technology needs to continue in the R&D phase but it is not ready for production.”
Adm. Mullen: Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, May 13, 2009
“But until we move to a point where it looks like that R&D is going to produce something, then I very much favor the decisions that have been made, that we keep those investment streams focused on boost -- that's the toughest problem that we have -- as well as the Multiple Kill Vehicle. Those are two enormous problems, and we need an R&D and S&T investment to know that we're headed on a clear path. I also think that the resources in this budget support the national security of the American people.”
Lt. Gen. O’Reilly: Testimony to the HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee, May 21, 2009[10]
On the GMD: “Thirty operational GBIs will provide the United States with a substantial inventory of operational interceptors considering the limited number of ICBM launch complexes in North Korea and Iran and the long development time required for additional launch complexes.”
On MKV: “We will terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program because it is not a necessary capability to defeat rogue threats, and its significant technical challenges and long development timeline warrants review of other capabilities to provide a more near-term hedge against future threats.”
On KEI: “We will also terminate the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) program since its capability is also inconsistent with the missile defense mission to counter rogue nation threats and for cost growth, schedule delays, and its lack of technology maturity.”
“The original KEI mission grew from a boost phase only mission to a boost and mid-course mission. The development schedule grew from 5 1/2 years to 12 to 14 years (depending on spirals), program cost grew from $4.6B to $8.9B, and the missile average unit production cost grew from $25M to over $50M per interceptor. Technical issues delayed the first booster flight test date (established in 2007) by over a year and we assess the probability of this flight test occurring this year as very unlikely. Affordability and government requirements growth, not contractor performance, was the main contributor to KEI's execution problems. Given the above and that 15% of the $8.9B worth of work on contract till 2018 has been accomplished, the KEI program was terminated.”
On Cost Overruns and Flight Test Delays and Failures: “During FY 2008 and FY 2009 to date, we experienced 8 significant flight test delays, 4 target failures out of 18 target launches, and one interceptor failure in flight. These and other contributing factors have resulted in $264 million of cost growth. Further, we have incurred over $252 million in unplanned costs and 25 weeks of schedule revisions due to unplanned operational deployments of our systems under development.”
“In a March 2009 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that 11 of 14 MDA contractors overran their FY 2008 budgeted costs by $152 million, or 3.7 percent… Since current BMDS contracts were initiated, we have had 31 contract realignments, adding nearly $14 billion to the value of the contracts.”
David Altwegg: Pentagon News Briefing on the FY10 MDA Budget Request, May 7, 2009[11]
MDA Budget: “I mean, everyone likes to believe that somebody said, "You got $7.8 billion now, spend it wisely, but your call." Wrong. Our budget was approved by the Missile Defense Executive Board some months ago and then became THE budget. In other words, the Missile Defense Agency does not determine the content of THE budget. The Missile Defense Executive Board makes that decision based on our recommendation.”
“We have been on a fixed budget in the seven years I've been at the agency, so that when there are program overruns, we either take money from you or we stretch our program. We have never gone to the Department and said we need more money in our budget because we have not managed it properly or it's too complex or whatever the reason. Never in the seven years that the agency has existed have we gone and asked for more money.”
On MKV and KEI: “Well, first, it is our value judgment that the track we were on with the -- those capabilities was, in fact, going to turn out to be unaffordable, and the technology really was not adequately harnessed as of this time.”
“With KEI, of course, the program was curtailed and became a booster program last year. And we've had problems with materials, with electronics. We've had multiple problems with the materials. By that I mean cases bursting during static-fire tests or pre-testing of samples. All of those are not behind us, hence, a test that we thought at one time this year was going to be in August of '09 has now slipped into November.”
Lt. Gen. Campbell
On having 30 GMD interceptors fielded in California and Alaska vs. the planned 44, Lt. Gen. Campbell stated: “That number makes sense to us as we look at the threat and where the threat is going and how quickly we think the threat can get there.” He said the 30 interceptors was “capable of doing what we need it to do against the threat we designed it against; that threat, of course, was North Korea.”[12]
“Strategic Approach”
Many are skeptical that the cuts to missile defense were based on decisions to save money during a recession rather than through a strategic assessment of current and future threats. Concerns are justified as North Korea is ramping up their rhetoric and aggressive actions, but the statements made by senior Pentagon officials indicate confidence in our missile defense system today to counter North Korea’s immature and unsophisticated threat. However, their comments also suggest flaws in specific missile defense programs that have been targeted for cuts in FY10.
Gates announced in April 2009 that the defense budget was “exclusively influenced by factors other than simply finding a way to balance the books or fit under the ‘top line’” and that his budget recommendations were “the product of a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements, risks and needs for the purpose of shifting [the DoD] in a different strategic direction.”[13] Adm. Mullen also recently stated that the changes in the FY10 DoD spending plan, including the request for missile defense, were made using “a strategic approach” and that he did not “accept that line of criticism” from lawmakers who believed that funding decisions on weapons programs were made without any strategic forethought. [14]
All the criticism on the budget cuts and assertions that programs like the ABL, MKV and KEI are essential against rogue threats usually overshadow the reality of the technological fallibilities and the operational imperfections of these programs. So while media reports and Congressional leaders get buried in the numbers and the program cuts, attention should be paid to the fact that senior government officials of the DoD and the MDA are making unprecedented statements that point out the weaknesses and even strengths of the current BMDS. Perhaps the comments made by these officials should be an indicator and a telling sign of the current state of the nation’s missile defense system. While the BMDS has technologically advanced since the days of the Nike-Zeus program in the 1960s and Reagan’s SDI speech in 1983, substantial R&D and continued flight tests still need to be undertaken before procurement begins to ensure that these systems are appropriate for current and future threats and can protect America.
That is essentially the direction the current administration is going in regards to missile defense. On top of short- and medium- range threats, the administration is focused on making certain that these systems work, particularly for systems that are designed to protect the homeland. However, it is still unclear as to how the Obama administration will move forward with future budget proposals and what the administration’s comprehensive long-term strategy for missile defense will be, especially given the new emphasis on the ascent-phase technology. But recent statements by Pentagon officials should provide a more sobering assessment as to what direction the BMDS is headed in and what new technological improvements we can expect to see over the next year.
For a more detailed look at the FY10 Department of Defense missile defense budget, please take a look at the Center for Defense Information’s missile defense budget overview.
