In Brief

• Began major operations in 1984 • Espoused Cuban-Communist ideology and goals • Most celebrated action: siege of ambassador of Japan's residence and approx. 600 hostages in 1996

An estimated 35,000-60,000 Peruvians died as a result of terrorist and counter-terrorist intra-national violence during the 1980s and 1990s.  The Shining Path, inspired by Mao’s visions of revolution, and the Peruvian government combined to account for the majority of these losses.  However, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement contributed to the death and destruction tallies at a much lesser, but still significant, rate.  The MRTA, as the movement is referred to by its Spanish initials, was inspired by leftists who desired the overthrow of the government along the lines of the Cuban revolution.  While the MRTA remained largely in the Shining Path’s shadow, it did stage a spectacular siege of the Japanese ambassador’s residence in Lima, thereby capturing the attention of the international audience, which had remained largely oblivious to previous incidents.

The MRTA was named after Tupac Amaru II, a legendary 18^th century indigenous rebel who led 80,000 in battle against the Spanish colonialists.  The early founders of the MRTA expanded upon the leftist politics of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), which advocated the nationalization of industry and anti-imperialism.  Significantly, the man who emerged as MRTA’s original leader, Victor Polay, was both the son of a founding APRA member and the roommate of future Aprista and Peruvian President Alan Garcia.  Other influences included Che Guevara in Bolivia and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

Polay and the original cadre of the MRTA began operations in 1984 (excluding an initial Lima bank raid in May of 1982).  The group’s activities consisted largely of kidnappings and bombings in Lima and the Huallaga Valley region.  There is evidence of cooperation between the MRTA and coca producers in the Huallaga Valley, although the Shining Path had largely cornered the lucrative security trade of the drug market.  U.S. corporations and outposts, including Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurants, Texaco Corporation offices and U.S. Information Service Centers, were frequent bombing targets, but violence was also directed towards internal and non-U.S. targets.

The group announced a cessation of violence following the election of APRA party member Garcia to the presidency in 1985.  Garcia was allotted a year in which to fulfill his campaign promises but did not do so to the satisfaction of the MRTA leadership, and the campaign of violence was reinstated.  In 1987, MRTA claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Bolivian embassy in Lima and assassinated the Defense Minister Gen. Enrique Lopez Albuhar.  The MRTA was at its strongest at the end of the 1980s, also the dusk of the Garcia presidency, with forces estimated between 600-800.  Polay was captured by government counter-terrorist forces in February 1989 in the Andean city of Huancayo, but escaped along with 47 other (largely MRTA) prisoners from the maximum security prison Canto Grande on July 9, 1990.  It is possible that security forces and/or (then outgoing) government officials were complicit in the construction of the elaborate tunnel through which the prisoners escaped.

President Alberto Fujimori was elected in 1990 largely due to promises to crush the terrorists.  His efforts in this arena eventually led to the downfall of the MRTA.  In June 1992, Polay was captured a second time and remains imprisoned.  At this point, the leadership mantle of the MRTA was passed to a former textile union official, Nestor Cerpa Cartolini, a.k.a. Commandante Evaristo, another founding member and the group’s military commander.  After the capture of Polay and the amnesty offered by the government in 1993, many MRTA and Shining Path members renounced their respective terrorist organizations.  Human Rights groups loudly condemned this offer of amnesty but it did serve to further reduce the ranks of the MRTA.  Cerpa himself eluded capture for several years, leaving spots shortly before numerous police raids.  Cerpa reportedly left a Lima safe house in 1995 just before a major police raid resulted in the capture of 23 MRTA members and sympathizers, including American Lori Berenson.  Materials recovered from this raid indicated that the MRTA was plotting to storm the Peruvian Congress, while in session.  These plans foreshadowed the group’s final act.

The last action perpetrated by the MRTA was its most significant.  Cerpa coordinated the successful takeover of the Japanese ambassador’s Lima residence on Dec. 17, 1996.  The ambassador was hosting a party to celebrate Emperor Akihito’s birthday and the guest list included dignitaries from multiple nations.  The MRTA entered the residence in two groups.  The first were dressed as waiters and related staff and the second blasted through a wall in an adjacent building.  The siege was carried off without any casualties and resulted in the capture of around 600 hostages.  The situation was instantly covered by the international news media as the hostages included the ambassadors of Japan, Brazil, Bolivia, Cuba, South Korea, Austria and Venezuela, about six officials from the U.S. embassy, and Peruvian government officials (including Fujimori’s brother), among others.  The takeover was also economically detrimental to Peru, not only because the situation highlighted its security troubles, but also threatened the continuation of generous Japanese investment and aid contributions.  

MRTA released four sets of demands in exchange for the prisoners’ release.  They asked that all MRTA prisoners be released (Cerpa’s wife was rumored to be one of those imprisoned); payment of a ‘war tax’ to MRTA; the safe release of the hostage-takers to a location in the Peruvian jungle safe-haven; and changes in economic policy – including the reversal of privatization efforts.  As a goodwill gesture, approximately 200 women and elderly were released almost immediately.  Staggered releases of prisoners continued as the siege wore on, bringing the number of hostages detained for the total time period to 71.  Fujimori remained consistent in his non-negotiation stance, but the Uruguayan government released two MRTA captives shortly before the release of its ambassador.

None of the MRTA’s demands were met by the Peruvian government, although the situation did highlight abuses rampant in Peruvian prisons.  After 127 days, Peruvian Armed Forces entered the residence via several tunnels and killed all of the terrorists on April 22, 1997.  One hostage also died in the counter-raid.  Reports later suggested that the hostage-takers had surrendered and were summarily executed. 

With the death of the approximately 18 hostage takers, MRTA suffered heavily and no significant activities have been attributed to the group since. 

Sources:

Alexander, Yonah (Ed.), Combating Terrorism:  Strategies of Ten Countries, Michigan:  University of Michigan Press, 2002.

Associated Press (AP), "Peru Rebels Raid Envoy's Home and Seize Hundreds of Hostages," The New York Times, Dec. 18, 1996, A1.

James Brooke, “Peru Rebels Raid Envoy's Home And Seize Hundreds of Hostages,” The New York Times, Dec. 19, 1996, A12.

Clifford Krauss, “In a Lima Slum, No Support for Hostage Takers,” The New York Times, Dec. 25, 1996, A3.

Clifford Krauss, "Diplomats in Peru Shuttle to Talks to Free Hostages," The New York Times, Dec. 20, 1996, A1.

Clifford Krauss, “Peru Rebels Free 225 Hostages, But Retain Many of High Rank,” The New York Times, Dec. 23, 1996, A1.

Clifford Krauss, “Taking Hostages in Peru; Revolution as a Relic Come to Life,” The New York Times, Dec. 29, 1996, D1.

Laqueur, Walter, The New Terrorism:  Fanaticism and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2000.

Calvin Sims, "Peru Shrugged Off Warnings of Rebel Attack, Experts Say," The New York Times, Dec. 20, 1996, A1.

Calvin Sims, “Peru's Rebel Leader: An Able Talker and Terrorist,” The New York Times, Dec. 23, 1996, A1.

Diana Jean Schemo, “A Born Revolutionary's Path To a Living 'Tomb' in Peru,” The New York Times, Jan. 4, 1997, A1.

Stern, Steve (Ed.), Shining and Other Paths:  War and Society in Peru, North Carolina:  Duke University Press, 1980-1995.

Strong, Simon, Shining Path:  Terror and Revolution in Peru, Times Books, 1992.