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What to do with Afghanistan: Prospects for Stability
After the initial campaign in Afghanistan comes to an end, the question of what to do with Afghanistan will be an essential security dilemma facing the international community. Even now, as bombs continue to pound the country, discussions about Afghanistan's fate already are being discussed. The solution to the failure of Afghanistan as a state, as a provider of a viable livelihood for its citizens, is not clear-cut. But some kind of nation-building will have to be undertaken if there is any chance for Afghanistan to recover from its long history of strife and poverty. Nation-building is not something with which the administration of President George W. Bush has expressed comfort. Even before taking office, members of the Bush team expressed dislike of nation-building, suggesting that it is an inappropriate use of U.S. troops and resources. During the presidential debates, Bush, himself, indicated that he would not have engaged in "nation-building" in Haiti, intervened in Rwanda to prevent genocide, or become involved in the Balkans. Bush did approve of the Australian intervention in Timor, but that was because the United States played only a logistical and support role. Unfortunately, post-war reconstruction of state capacity and civil society, as well as the creation of a viable economy, will be required in Afghanistan. And what appears to be needed is exactly the kind of thing the Bush administration has vowed to avoid. Nonetheless, the United States has no choice but to lead the process of developing a nation-building strategy. It is important to remember that following the mujahidin defeat of the Russian-backed government, and after the civil war that ensued when the international community left Afghanistan to its own devices, the Taliban emerged as the victors. If the U.S. war aims in Afghanistan are to be met — namely, making sure the country no longer is a safe haven for terrorists — the country cannot again be abandoned by the international community.
The immediate needs of Afghanistan are great. As winter approaches, the country faces a humanitarian crisis. There were already an estimated 3.6 million refugees, and up to one million internally displaced persons before the current conflict. Even before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and the launch of the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, the World Food Program (WFP) had estimated nearly 4 million Afghans would face severe hunger during the upcoming winter. Now, the WFP believes that six million Afghans will require food assistance, and that 1.5 million face a severe food shortage. (The food drops by U.S. troops are believed to be only 1 percent of what's currently needed in Afghanistan). In addition, the healthcare system in Afghanistan is almost non-existent. The UN Population Fund reports that 99 percent of births in Afghanistan are unattended, and the maternal mortality rate is 17 per 1,000, the second highest in the world. Basic health services, particularly for women, are absent in Afghanistan. Any immediate aid program should also include medicine, doctors and health care facilities. Therefore, a priority must be to create the ability for aid agencies to get humanitarian aid to those who desperately need it. Even before the official air campaign ends, safe zones can be established to provide emergency medical aid, including immunizations, deliver food assistance, and supply warm clothes and blankets in advance of winter. Aid agencies and the United Nations should work with neighboring countries, as is currently being done with Pakistan and Tajikistan, to protect aid deliveries and refugees needing assistance. This immediate first step, to deal with the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan before the winter, will only work effectively with the cooperation of the U.S. military, aid agencies, and international organizations.
The mechanisms established for needs assessment, infrastructure development, and aid provision in the near-term also should be the basis for long-term institution building throughout the country. Because the needs of Afghanistan are so vast, any post-war effort in Afghanistan will have to address the military, political, economic and social needs of the country, which are great and varied. Once on the ground, a nation-building effort in Afghanistan must deal with the reasons the state has failed — the root causes of the country's difficulties. In Afghanistan, these include (but are not limited to) severe poverty, lack of health services, poor educational systems, corruption, and the proliferation of weapons. Children in particular face tremendous hardships in Afghanistan. Almost 11 million out of a total of near 22 million people are under the age of 18. Nearly one-quarter of children die before their fourth birthday. The country has only a 31.5 percent overall literacy rate, with the female population having only a 4.7 percent literacy rate. Less than one-third of boys and one-tenth of girls participate in some form of education. Indeed, the Taliban has relied on its system of madrasas, or military/religious schools, to indoctrinate the young, and literacy is obtained primarily through the teaching of the Koran in the madrasas. Both the Taliban and Northern Alliance have used children as soldiers. It is important to recognize that religious fundamentalism per se did not cause Afghanistan to fail, rather, it was the factor that enabled the Taliban to gain and keep power. The foundation of Afghanistan's poor economy is the drug trade. Significantly, the trade in opium pays for weapons acquisition, and many inside the country — which is harsh and mountainous — have not been eager to pursue alternative forms of income. Any post-war effort must assist in the creation of legitimate opportunities for a legal economy. While foreign investment in Afghanistan is not going to be rapidly forthcoming, sustainable business development must be encouraged. The reliance on opium must be eliminated and alternatives found. Furthermore, while most military interventions must have a component that focuses on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the remnants of war must also be addressed. Afghanistan is dealing with the legacy of more than 20 years of fighting and the population is heavily armed with millions of unaccounted-for weapons. Rumors of the Taliban providing weapons to every family may in fact prove accurate. Weapons must be collected and destroyed to ensure that former combatants do not hold onto them in case the nation building doesn't occur to their liking. Further, these demobilized, and severely under-educated, fighters must be taught the necessary skills for reentering society as productive contributors. These soldiers must be given a place in the rebuilding of their country. In addition, the physical remnants of war — landmines, cluster bombs, etc., must also be removed from the country to allow people to return to "normal" life. Demining and clearance programs must be developed in advance and implemented as rapidly as possible to allow nation building to commence. Unfortunately, building a new, legitimate government to partner in a nation-building effort is already proving a daunting task. "Nation-builders" will have to be as inclusive as possible and attempt not to alienate the various factions, ethnic groups, and political movements in attempting to build a new government. (Ethnic groups in Afghanistan include: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Aimaks, Turkmen, Baloch, and Uzbek. Political parties include: Taliban and United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UNIFSA) — also known as the Northern Alliance — made up of 13 parties opposed to the Taliban, including Harakat-i-Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Movement of Afghanistan), Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party), Hizb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami (Islamic Unity Party), Jumaat-i-Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Afghan Society), Jumbish-i-Milli (National Front), and Mahaz-i-Milli-i-Islami (National Islamic Front. Further, a possible role for the exiled Afghan King must be examined, for the contribution to legitimacy he might provide to any future government. However, the King is in his mid-eighties, and the duration of his reign would obviously be short-lived. While planning is underway for some kind of coalition government, such plans could be overcome by a quick Northern Alliance military victory. This is perhaps not in the best interest of a stable Afghan state. Northern Alliance rule of Afghanistan presents its own unique problems of legitimacy and may not result in a representative government that can ensure the stability of Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance participated in the civil war in Afghanistan, and indeed is responsible for great destruction in Kabul and other areas of Afghanistan. The U.S. State Department has said that a takeover by the Northern Alliance "would only rekindle the anger of the Pashtun tribes in southern Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan, and it would likely result in a renewed war." (New York Times, Oct. 12, 2001) While to date, India and Russia have strongly supported the Northern Alliance — as Pakistan has backed the Taliban — both Afghanistan and its neighbors would be better served by a broad-based collaborative government that can go about the business of rebuilding the country as quickly as possible. (Pakistan had backed the Taliban in part to undertake operations against India in Kashmir, and India, as a result, backed the Taliban-opposing Northern Alliance. But the exploitation of the Afghan political and military turmoil by its neighbors has only helped fuel regional instability and conflict.) As the political environment is strengthened, a secure economic and social environment must also be developed. Continued violence and conflict must cease in order for "normal" life to resume. Reconstruction must occur within a stabile environment. Police, the judiciary, other official government institutions, as well as political parties and specialized interest groups are essential to the creation of an environment of sustainable human security. The role of Afghanistan's neighbors is also of extreme importance. Pakistan has served as Afghanistan's most important neighbor — and has mixed reviews as to its involvement leading up to the recent conflict. However, Afghanistan cannot recover without the support of Pakistan, and a comfortable arrangement must be reached. This of course, also depends on the stability of Pakistan's government and its political and military situation. While too much emphasis on the role of Pakistan in the recovery of Afghanistan may negatively impact the nation-building process, not enough will also raise problems. In addition, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have important supporting roles to play. Some of Afghanistan's largest ethnic groups are of Uzbek and Tajik origin, and both countries, accused of flooding the country with weapons in the past, now have acknowledged their willingness to support peaceful solutions and rebuilding. However, Afghanistan's reconstruction cannot be the sole burden of its neighbors — including Russia — because of recent history, and because the region is economically strapped. The effort further cannot be left to one country alone, neither to Pakistan (who fell into the role of Afghan protector out of self-protection) nor the United States. But determining the point country, or organization, to lead a nation-building effort is not an easy proposition. For the United States, the question is whether Washington lead the effort; and if so, outside of, or within an existing international organization such as the United Nations. The Bush administration, as noted, is not at all comfortable with the idea of nation-building. Although Bush has acknowledged in recent weeks that the United States cannot simply leave after the military campaign is over, officials close to the president have recognized his reluctance to have Washington lead post-war follow-up. "He doesn't want a Vietnam, and he doesn't want to communicate to the Muslim world that we are another occupying force. He keeps saying, `I don't want to leave American troops there,' but he knows that the only way to keep this powder keg from going up again is that the United States and its allies will have to make a long-term commitment of money and of people," one official said. (New York Times, Oct. 12, 2001). U.S. leadership in reconstruction may in fact not be the best solution for Afghanistan. The U.S. brand of democracy may not translate well to a country that has been burdened by civil war for more than 20 years, with actors that share neither ethnic nor historical ties with the United States. A regional perspective on nation-building is perhaps more appropriate in this case. Moreover, the United States is geographically far from Afghanistan, and unlikely to be the first nation to respond to any new crisis in the country. Afghanistan's neighbors should be more invested in a nation-building success or failure because they are directly impacted, and are more likely to be the first to respond to future problems. Given the complicated nature of Afghanistan's situation, the United Nations would be useful on many fronts — political, military, and logistical. A UN effort also may be able to garner a sense of legitimacy not so easily available to a random coalition of countries. But working within the UN system also raises some challenges. As former John G. Ruggie, former UN assistant secretary-general, has said, the United Nations is "severely limited by its member states in the kinds of military operations it can undertake." (Washington Post, Oct. 26, 2001). Ruggie mentions logistical problems faced by UN peacekeepers as an impediment to a successful Afghan mission, including resources, problems with quantity and type of equipment, and lack of unit cohesion. In addition, Afghanistan is not a strictly peacekeeping mission, and challenges would arise in terms of mission definition and scope. Sending in a UN force unprepared, without a clearly defined mission and political and financial resources is something about which Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN special envoy for Afghanistan, cautioned the Security Council on Oct. 16 (Washington Post, Oct. 17, 2001). In any event, once responsibility for leading and participating in the mission has been determined, the mission in Afghanistan must clearly be defined. Most significantly, it is crucial to set some form of end state — as opposed to end date — at which point the intended goals will be achieved. Any nation-building force cannot remain in Afghanistan indefinitely and, while not rushing the endeavor, every effort must be undertaken to ensure that the mission rapidly incorporates positive change. In addition, the mission must be clearly defined to make sure that the right people are assigned the right jobs. The military should not be solely responsible for helping re-build infrastructures. The international community must also ask themselves whether, once the current fighting is complete, should this even be a military operation? To be successful, however, any nation-building endeavor must be planned now — rather than scrambled together after the end of U.S. military intervention. Early and integrated planning will help cultivate donor support — both money and manpower for the mission. Getting people on the ground as quickly as possible and beginning the reconstruction process is necessary to avoid backsliding. Moreover, the support of the Afghan people for whatever intervention is planned is essential. Brahimi has stated that the Afghans would not support foreign troops in Afghanistan. "They don't like being ordered around by foreigners…especially in military uniforms," Brahimi told the New York Times. Developing the mission with the Afghan population, in terms of their needs, will facilitate any kind of nation-building and humanitarian mission.
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