Peacekeepers Beware

 
Peacekeeping in Afghanistan is likely to prove intensely difficult and fraught with danger.

Afghanis have historically insisted that their rulers be Afghans and only Afghans. Their blood hatred of foreigners with guns - or in the case of Alexander the Great, swords and spears - goes back millennia. Pashtun, Hazara, Uzbek, or Tajik - all at various times in history have united to battle armed invaders. The British left their bones in the 19^th century, the Russians in the 20^th, and foreign peacekeepers are likely to risk leaving theirs in the 21^st.

Armed foreign peacekeepers in Afghanistan in charge of airfields, food warehouses, traffic, or anything else almost inevitably will challenge local authorities, serve to rally some young males to the most radical Afghan factions, and become the target of mujahidin. They may well suffer casualties, and ultimately face the dismal prospect of either bringing in reinforcements or leaving.

Despite the dangers, the movement to organize peacekeepers is well underway. American, British, and French military officials are meeting at the U.S. Central Command Headquarters in Tampa to finalize plans for organizing a mainly-Muslim coalition force. "There is a growing expectation that Turkey will lead the international peacekeeping mission," said Turkish Embassy spokesman Mehmet Ali Bayer. "We look at this favorably." Additional troop contingents from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Jordan are likely.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair had put 4,000 troops on alert for deployment, and, with U.S. cooperation, has inserted 100 or so British marines at Bagram airfield 22 miles north of Kabul to facilitate the receipt of military and relief supplies. British officials also say troops are necessary to maintain order in case Afghani factions fight among themselves. They want to ensure that no single Afghan militia controls Kabul. The French agree, and also prepared to dispatch their forces to an airfield outside of Mazar-e Sharif in the north.

Although Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that it was "highly unlikely" U.S. forces would join the peacekeepers once the fighting has ended, American officials have told Northern Alliance leaders to "play ball" with the peacekeepers or risk the loss of U.S. military support and reconstruction assistance. Pakistan also strongly supports an international peacekeeping presence in order to prevent complete Northern Alliance control of the capital.

Afghan leaders of all stripes have not endorsed these peacekeeping preparations. The current United Nations-brokered talks in Bonn among anti-Taliban Afghan representatives have dealt with the security issue. Pashtun delegates, insisting that their forces must be responsible for security in their tribal areas and not those under the command of the Northern Alliance, have threatened to support an international peacekeeping force if their position is not accepted by the Northern Alliance. Long-time Afghan watchers see the Pashtun threat as a bargaining chip.

Northern Alliance delegates, representing the group most hostile to peacekeepers, are likely to agree to the Pashtun demand. "We have a demilitarized Kabul now, and we have security," said Haron Amin, the Northern Alliance envoy in Washington. "That means no international forces are needed for security in Kabul." Jane's Defense Weekly reports that 2,000 Northern Alliance police are at work in Kabul disarming residents and are somewhat successfully keeping order. Amin told Michael G. Gordon of The New York Times "that if international forces were to be deployed, their duties must be spelled out in advance and the move must be coordinated with the United Nations and the Northern Alliance."

Even the small contingent of British marines inserted at Bagram airfield, who arrived without advanced approval, were only reluctantly allowed to remain, but the large number of planned British reinforcements was not permitted.

Further opposition to the presence of armed peacekeepers without Northern Alliance consent came Nov. 20 from Foreign Minister Abdullah. "Any such decision - which would be considered a major development - should be discussed with us," Abdullah said. "At this state there hasn't been such a consultation with us."

Even after some banditry targeting journalists in areas under Northern Alliance control (journalists are known to carry wads of dollars and valuable equipment), the Northern Alliance continued to reject outside peacekeeping. "If the forces which are on the ground, who are familiar with the terrain and the people, are not capable of bringing security," National Alliance Foreign Minister Abdullah told the press on Nov. 27, "it would be very difficult for foreign troops to do so."

When the Taliban fled Kabul, UN special representative for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi called for an "all-Afghan council" backed by multinational security force. Brahimi has since shifted position and now advocates an all-Afghan security force, a proposal he will undoubtedly push in the Bonn talks. After composing a provisional government, Brahimi has said he will urge that body to develop a security plan. "We hope that [the Bonn talks] would be the beginning we have been looking for to end the conflict in Afghanistan and start building new institutions for the country," Brahimi told the Washington Post on Nov. 20. Political authority must rest with the Afghan people.

Some in the Pentagon are now having second thoughts about backing a foreign peacekeeping effort. "I would not discount the possibility that most of the security work will be done and continue to be done by the Afghans themselves, assuming the conflict with the Taliban up there is cleared up and the pockets of resistance vanish," said Joseph Collins, a deputy assistant secretary of defense. Perhaps the most skeptical statement came Nov. 18 from Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, an official never fond of peacekeeping. "One of the lessons of Afghanistan's history, which we've tried to apply in this campaign, is if you're a foreigner, try not to go in. If you go in, don't stay too long, because they don't tend to like any foreigners who stay too long."

The skeptics have good reason to be wary.

Guns are not likely to get Afghan tribes to work together. Quite the contrary. Foreigners with guns will tempt and encourage various Afghan factions to manipulate and use the armed peacekeepers (as happened in Somalia) to attack their domestic political rivals. The opportunity to use the guns of foreigners, as all the anti-Taliban forces have been doing in the current struggle, would continue. More guns more likely would breed more violence.

Reliance on unarmed mediators, educators, civil and electrical engineers, medical personnel, agronomists, heavy-equipment instructors, de-mining experts, and a host of other reconstruction professionals, on the other hand, are more apt to produce positive results. This would convince Afghans that foreigners have no intention of seizing political control or being king-makers. Every Afghan "knows" that political power rests ultimately with the gun, and thus the absence of guns on the foreigners strips them of political ambition. An unarmed presence - as aid workers in Afghanistan have been for years, even under the Taliban - would highlight the positive, humanitarian, and benevolent intentions of foreigners, whether UN personnel, non-governmental (NGO) aid workers, or military advisors and construction specialists. It would place the responsibility for governing on the Afghans, exactly where it belongs.

A case can even be made that traditional peacekeepers are without roles to play in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. According to international law and UN doctrine, peacekeepers must have the consent of the warring parties and be responsible for the following roles: 1. interpose armed forces between the warring parties after a ceasefire has been arranged; 2. monitor and maintain the ceasefire, including disarming the combatants; and 3. facilitate a permanent political settlement by providing security to the indigenous political groups and their representatives.

None of these roles is appropriate for Afghanistan. The consent of the Taliban is irrelevant because its destruction is the initial objective of the war. As long as the victors - the Northern Alliance and various Pashtun militias - do not war against each other, there is no need for a ceasefire, no need to interpose armed forces between warring parties, and no need to disarm the combatants. There is also no need to provide security to indigenous political groups and their representatives. They can provide it themselves.

Advocates of peacekeeping will argue that Afghanistan will remain a dangerous country, even with the Taliban and al Qaeda vanquished. Foreign personnel will need to protect themselves. But why not rely on Afghans to provide protection to those from outside who will work for the rehabilitation of Afghanistan? Why compete with these fiercely patriotic fighters in the job to bring law and order to the land? Already, the anti-Taliban forces are providing security for U.S. and British Special Forces operating in the countryside, aid workers and journalists in the cities under their control, and British marines working to bring the Bagram airfield north of Kabul back into operating condition for receiving military and relief supplies.

A massive foreign presence is undoubtedly needed. Estimates for reconstructing Afghanistan run into the billions and many Afghans need to be trained to do the job. But a benign presence oriented to reconciling tribal interests and serving local needs will do wonders for this war-ravaged country. In contrast, foreigners with guns will likely ignite a whole new round of violence.

By Dr. Nicholas Berry

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