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Threats to U.S. Targets in Southeast Asia
However the primary reason why the alert state was raised does not relate to threats to the U.S. homeland at all. Ashcroft said information from a 'senior al Qaeda operative' in detention, corroborated with other material, indicated possible attacks in that could coincide with Sept. 11. At some point on Sept. 9, officials said the detainee provided specific information that U.S. targets in South East Asia might be bombed. Initial comments by law enforcement officials and others described the source as an al Qaeda member held somewhere other than the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. However, The New York Times in two stories referred to Omar al-Faruq, an al Qaeda member taken into custody on the central Indonesian island of Java in June, as the probable source for the information. There was also word that the terrorists had been gathering explosives since early this year, and this matched with information from Singaporean about explosives reported missing late last year The result was that U.S. Embassies in Pakistan, Indonesia, Vietnam and Bahrain were closed as well as lower-status missions in Malaysia, Cambodia, Tajikistan, Malawi and the United Arab Emirates. Other information indicated that other Middle Eastern terrorists might launch attacks on U.S. facilities, and there were further worries that the large number of low-level terrorists trained in the Afghan camps, acting without orders, might mount freelance attacks on the Sept. 11 anniversary. The anniversary situation again shows how difficult judgment on these issues of warning can be. The Homeland Security Advisory System was originally set up partially in response to criticism over repeated, non-specific warnings in late 2001. Now the alert has been raised primarily due to threats overseas — it seems. Officials must walk a tricky line between how much information to give to induce urgency, without making public information that might warn potential attackers that their communications have been intercepted or that might prompt them to delay their attacks until precautions have been rescinded. Al Qaeda has not previously usually attacked on dates significant to the West. Neither the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 East Africa embassy bombing, or the attack on the USS Cole were on particularly significant dates. More likely are attacks on dates significant to al Qaeda - such as Oct. 7, the anniversary of the start of the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan. However, given this particular anniversary and the possibility of other, possibly copycat, attacks the alert could be justified. Remaining questions for the future include whether the HSAS will continue to be moved for threats that are primarily to U.S. interests abroad — or whether Sept. 11 was a special case. Also, given that this is the first raising of the terrorist alert, what circumstances might be required for it to be lowered? Will this increased orange level of alert remain unchanged, or will it be dropped again soon after Sept. 11? How responsive will the system become to changing levels of threat? Obviously, with Osama bin Laden on the loose seemingly for some time to come, the level cannot be reset to 'Low'. Yet the system risks losing relevance if its current orange status is allowed to set into permanence. Officials should seriously consider a relatively swift reversion to its 'Elevated', yellow status if no threats eventuate on or immediately after Sept. 11. Sources Raymond Bonner, "Plan to attack embassies in South East Asia Cited for Terror Alert", The New York Times, Sept. 11, 2002 Dan Eggen & Alan Sipress, "White House Raises Terror Alert," Sept. 11, 2002 David E. Sanger and David Johnston, "U.S. Steps Up Alert as Solemn Day Approaches," The New York Times, Sept. 11, 2002 B. Raman, "September 11 - Will Al Qaeda Repeat?," Outlook India, Sept. 6, 2002
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