Terrorism and Military Priorities

In the wake of the Sept. 11 tragedy a number of federal agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of State and the Justice Department, will be seeking additional resources to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism. Despite its relatively small role in counter-terrorism, the Defense Department also is expected to receive significant funding increases over the next few years as a result of Sept. 11, and it is exceedingly likely that much of this new funding will be allocated for programs unrelated to terrorism or other emerging threats to U.S. national security.

What follows is a compilation of initiatives, technologies and programs that should receive top priority as the Defense Department allocates these new resources. Further, these programs have merit beyond their value in helping the Defense Department fulfill its counter-terrorism role, as the U.S. military attempts to transform to better meet the challenges of the 21st century and beyond.

 
THE OBVIOUS/UNDERWAY

Transport

It is impossible, and in fact unwise, to anticipate all future deployments of U.S. military forces that may be necessary, and to try to put the requisite forces already in place. There must, therefore, be continued efforts to improve the transportability and flexibility of U.S. forces. This includes continued upgrades and expansion of the sealift and fixed-wing airlift fleets, improved capabilities of the existing fleet of helicopters with an emphasis on supporting Special Forces operations, and replacement of the Air Force's aging airborne tanker fleet. It also includes improvements and security upgrades at domestic embarkation locations — airfields and ports — for the military.

 
Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance

U.S. capability to collect electronic intelligence, through the use of satellites and fixed-wing aircraft (U-2, RC-135 "Rivet Joint," Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, Airborne Warning and Control System), has received considerable attention over the past two decades, and is extremely sophisticated and effective. Nonetheless, a thorough assessment of these assets should be conducted to determine where additional capabilities, either through development of new technologies or the deployment of more platforms, are appropriate. The United States should also develop a space-based capability for real-time radar tracking of mobile targets on land or sea.

In recent years HUMINT - the use of human beings as the primary sources and collectors of information — has been neglected. [According to Gen. Hugh Shelton, the recently retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this lack of human intelligence gathering capabilities is not a failing of the intelligence community, but the result of a conscious decision to "get out of the human intelligence business to a large degree." "Shelton Departs, Citing Spy Force as Weak Link," Defense News, Oct. 1, 2001.] This capability cannot be reconstituted overnight, but efforts to do so should be begun immediately.

There is also a shortage of analysts available to sift through the already staggering amount of intelligence information coming in, and a lack of support infrastructure, including such simple things as computers. Further, there are extremely limited numbers of linguists with skills in "non-traditional" languages.

 
UAVs/UCAVs

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been used effectively in recent years, providing accurate real-time intelligence. According to numerous press reports, armed UAVs (UCAVs) are already operational and are currently deployed in Afghanistan. However, relatively few UAVs are available. For example, the Air Force has as few as seven low altitude Predators available for immediate operations. The Air Force also owns four medium altitude Global Hawks, and plans to buy 6 more by 2006. Northrop Grumman has proposed doubling its output and moving up delivery of the next to aircraft to the end of next year. ("Military Looks At Surveillance Stockpile and Finds a Dearth," New York Times, Oct. 1, 2001.)

The Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year (FY) 2001 states "it shall be a goal of the Armed Forces to achieve the fielding of unmanned, remotely controlled technology such that...by 2010, one-third of the aircraft in the operational deep strike force aircraft fleet are unmanned."

 
Command and Control

Data management is one of the keys to the modern battlefield. Tactical intelligence about the enemy, status of friendly forces, terrain, weather, and literally hundreds of other pieces of information have to be gathered, sifted, interpreted and integrated into an ever-changing battle plan. Information flows constantly between sensors, planners and troops in the field. Good intelligence information often has an extremely short "shelf-life," so it is critical to reduce the sensor to shooter time; to be capable of operating within the infamous "10 minute window." Greater command and control through improved data management is essential in modern warfare. Development of "network-centric" warfare — using a system of systems — should be expanded.

 
Precision Guided Munitions

Since Operation Desert Storm, the United States has increasingly used precision guided munitions (PGMs) — cruise missiles and "smart" bombs — as the weapon of choice in attacking ground targets. During Desert Storm, roughly 9 percent of all munitions dropped were PGMs. This increased to 70 percent during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, and is estimated at nearly 90 percent so far for Operation Enduring Freedom. Current stocks of the latest PGMs, which use Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance and provide extremely accurate, all-weather strike capabilities, need to be expanded, and the development and fielding of the next generation of "smart" bombs and cruise missiles need to be accelerated. This includes (not exclusively): the development of the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), which would allow more targets to be attacked per sortie and with less collateral damage; and increasing the inventory of sea-launched Tomahawk Block 3 models by resuming Tomahawk production and/or upgrading older model Tomahawks already in the inventory until the next-generation Tactical Tomahawk is available in sufficient numbers.

The Navy already plans to increase its inventory of Tomahawk Block 3 through continued upgrades of less sophisticated models and new procurement. Unlike its predecessors, the Block 3 model is equipped with GPS guidance. Plans include $400 million in FY'02 (supplemental) and $560 million in FY'03 for upgrades, plus $40 million to restart the Tomahawk Block 3 line. Tomahawk Block 3 production ended in January 1999. Production of the Tactical Tomahawk, which, in addition to having GPS guidance, can loiter over a target area while group operators select a target for it, is expected to begin in 2003. ("U.S. Navy Seeks to Increase Tomahawk Missile Arsenal," Defense News, Oct. 8, 2001)

While GPS weapons are clearly higher priority, a significant inventory of laser-guided, optically-guided and terrain-guided PGMs should be maintained. In future conflicts, potential enemies with greater technological sophistication than those faced to date will likely attempt to disable, temporarily if not permanently, the U.S. GPS network.

 
Spare Parts

Reports regarding persistent shortages of spare parts, leading in certain cases to cannibalization of equipment, have been common in recent years (although are considered relatively uncommon in deployed units). In the short term, increased stores of certain spares may be needed while efforts to streamline logistical support — such as "just in time" delivery — are implemented

 
NEW IDEAS?

Aircraft Self-Protection Equipment

While air strikes can be extremely effective in eliminating an enemy's static air defense network, shoulder-held, man-portable, surface-to-air missiles remain a threat for the duration of any conflict. They have proven to be particularly effective against helicopters, which are integral for ground operations and in support of Special Forces. Current countermeasures should be improved, and new technologies and tactics need to be developed. For example, an integrated electronic/infrared warning and defense system is currently under development by the Navy. Such a system could eventually be applicable to all military and commercial aircraft.

 
Accelerated Digitization of The Soldier

On the modern battlefield, direct access to real-time data is essential for maintaining situational awareness. This is particularly critical for forces operating autonomously in a hostile environment (i.e., behind enemy lines). Efforts to provide necessary, user-friendly information in a timely manner and interconnect the soldiers on the battlefield should be expanded and accelerated.

 
Mine Detection/Clearing

In certain situations, one of the greatest threats to U.S. troops on the battlefield is the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance. For obvious logistical reasons, certain areas of operation and situations preclude the use of large mine-clearing equipment, or insufficient time exists for the removal of individual explosives. Easily deployable mine detection/clearing technologies, with both combat and peacetime uses, should be developed.

 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar)

Although these programs are already in place and functioning, they are perhaps the single best response to what is arguably the greatest threat to U.S. national security — the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their related technologies. They should continue to be developed and expanded.

 
DU Alternatives

For operational reasons, it remains highly unlikely that the U.S. military will ever cease using depleted uranium (DU) ammunition. However, because of the consistent controversy that surrounds DU, there may well be situations where its use represents a political liability sufficient to merit the use of alternatives, regardless of their relative costs. In combat operations where "winning the hearts and minds" of the local population is considered a high priority, use of alternative weapons which do not carry the stigma associated with DU could be valuable.

 
ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

Special Operations Forces

Does the United States have Special Operations Forces in sufficient numbers? This raises the broader question; is the military configured, trained and equipped to meet likely current and future threats to U.S. security?

 
Psychological Warfare

From the relatively crude blaring of rock music outside of President Manuel Noriega's palace during the invasion of Panama, to the dropping of Humanitarian Daily Ration (HDR) packets in Afghanistan, psychological warfare (PSYOPS) is a growing component of military operations. How best can PSYOPS be integrated in to more traditional forms of military action?

 
Complementary Capabilities

How can interoperability-access across governmental agencies (CIA-DOD-FBI) cooperation between coalition partners, and "jointness" between military services - be enhanced?

 

Compiled by Rear Adm. (Ret.) Stephen H. Baker CDI Senior Fellow sbaker@cdi.org and Christopher Hellman CDI Senior Analyst chellman@cdi.org

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