The ability of the United States to militarily dismantle the Taliban rule in Afghanistan is beyond question. However, the same cannot be said about U.S. capacity to stabilize that country, and, equally important, to bring an end to political instability in South and West Asia in general. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan has to be governed by a multi-ethnic and multi-factional coalition whose governability has to be secured, if not guaranteed, by the United States at least for a decade or so.
If the United States is to succeed in helping to create a stable Afghanistan, it must be equally resolute about rewarding Pakistan for Islamabad's courageous decision to side with Washington in the war on terrorism, a decision that incurred the wrath of the Islamist supporters of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden within Pakistan's own borders. And these rewards should be much more than merely offering a few million dollars in the form of economic assistance.
Undoubtedly, there is no short-term solution to the Afghan crisis. If Washington really wants to ensure that that country never again becomes a breeding ground for radical Islamist groups, it has to make sure that it facilitates the making of the previously described coalition. This facilitation of such a coalition is entirely different from unilaterally deciding which groups will formulate the next government, however. Any U.S. attempt to be a kingmaker in South Asia or the Middle East is likely to blow up in its face. The administration of George W. Bush needs to remind itself of the outcome of U.S. king-making debacles in Iran in the 1950s and in Lebanon in the 1980s. There are a number of other examples as well.
Why Pakistan Matters, And What It Wants
This process of coalition building therefore should be done with close cooperation between Pakistan and the United States, for several different reasons. The United States does not want to see the resurgence of the "Talibanization" of Afghanistan in the long run. If that country instead is governed by a multi-ethnic coalition, it is likely to remain a moderate Islamic polity. A patient and delicate process of cooperation between Washington and Islamabad may materialize this result.
It should be remembered that Pakistan's motivations for supporting the emergence of the Taliban between 1994 and 1996 were based on its acute desire to have a friendly Afghanistan, an objective that has driven that country since the days of Gen. Zia ul-Haq in the late 1970s. Pakistan wants to ensure that a future Afghan government will not become a party to the unceasing shenanigans emanating from the activities of Russia, Iran and India to outmaneuver or, worse, destabilize Pakistan. In fact, the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, which was in power after the ouster of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, made overtures toward India before it was firmly entrenched domestically. This policy posture of Afghanistan was not at all acceptable to Pakistan. The latter's decision to support the emergence of the Taliban in the early- to mid-1990s had, interalia, a lot to do with ensuring that India never gets an upper hand in Afghanistan.
Pakistan's ties with Iran also have worsened for the past several years. Iran blames Pakistan for bringing to power the Taliban, who have emerged as the chief tormentors of the Hazaras (Shia Afghan). When Iran and India established close political and economic relations in the recent past, Pakistan became especially wary over the implications of that evolving nexus for its strategic interests in the region. Now, more than ever before, Islamabad will insist on having a friendly government in Kabul.
It would be a mistake to assume that Iran's grievances against the Taliban and their chief supporter, Pakistan, were purely of a theological nature. One could comfortably argue that balance of power politics is one of the primary factors driving a wedge between a nuclear Pakistan and a "wannabe" nuclear Iran. The fledgling cooperation between Iran and India is an integral aspect of balance of power politics. It is difficult to predict how stable this relationship is likely to be in the coming years. After all, Iran is an Islamic theocracy that could turn against a Hindu-dominated India, especially when one considers that there is no telling who will really emerge as a victor from the continuing struggle between the pragmatists (led by President Sayed Mohammad Khatami) and the hard-liners (led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) in Iran.
Further, Pakistan's crucial role in ousting the former Soviet Union's Communist occupiers of Afghanistan has not been forgotten by the current rulers of the Soviet Union's successor state, Russia. To add insult to injury, Russia watched in dismay the crucial role that Pakistan played as an "enabler" of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan between 1994 and 1996. The alleged role of the Taliban in providing political and materiel support for the Islamist groups of neighboring Central Asia and Chechnya convinced Moscow that it had better become an active player in destabilizing, if not ousting, the Taliban rule from Afghanistan. To this end, Russia cooperated with Iran.
Russia's role under President Vladimir Putin is also a source of concern for Pakistan. Russia's involvement in providing materiel support to the Northern Alliance is a development that will not go away in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Pakistan is quite wary of Russia's seeking a significant voice in the modality of power-sharing among various groups in Afghanistan. That is one more reason why Pakistan wants not only to remain involved in the negotiating process leading to the creation of a post-Taliban ruling coalition, but also very much wants to see visible involvement of the United States. Pitting the lone superpower against a declining superpower in Afghanistan is a great strategy from the Pakistani perspective.
U.S. Engagement Must Be Long Term
From the American viewpoint, its high profile involvement in creating a post-Taliban coalition will keep it engaged in a region where terrorism may remain a continuing threat long after the defeat of the Taliban and destruction of al Qaeda. The arguably ill-advised policy of establishing strategic partnership with India, while isolating Pakistan, developed during the waning years of Bill Clinton's presidency and, pursued prior to the events of Sept. 11 by the Bush administration, appears distant today. The current policy of engaging both South Asian nations seems eminently in America's best interests. Besides, the United States can no longer afford to isolate a nuclear Pakistan and still hope that nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia — especially preventing the theft of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or even nuclear weapons — remains a viable and effective policy.
The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks against the United States have radically-and permanently-altered the balance of power politics in South and West Asia, a fact that makes Pakistan very jittery. Even if the United States and Russia were to remain close — the chances of which may not be very bright over the long run, given the fact that Russia will continue to pursue a whole slew of competitive interests, both within and outside South and Central Asia — Pakistan wishes to remain engaged with the United States. Pakistan's perspective regarding the balance of power in the region has to be seriously taken into consideration by both Washington and Moscow, but most significantly by the former.
This is because the United States may be able to find a long-term solution to terrorism only by committing itself to the maintenance of the balance of power in Pakistan's neighborhood. That means checking the potential imperialistic aspirations of Russia, and potential revolutionary ambitions of Iran, and guaranteeing the political status quo in South Asia with a resolved Kashmir issue as essential ingredients of a stable balance of power.
The fly in the ointment, however, is the willingness of the United States to commit itself to the role of a facilitator — along with Pakistan — and to ensure that this commitment remains unchanged for the next five to 10 years. As the lone superpower, America's strategic interests are much too cumbersome to remain focused on one particular region for long, even though South and West Asia remain highly explosive regions. But the U.S. "war" on transnational terrorism will have to go much beyond capturing or killing Osama bin Laden. Peace and stability in South and West Asia will neither be easy, nor materialize anytime soon, but neither can Washington afford continuing instability over the longer term.
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