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The existence of secure sanctuaries around the globe has allowed Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda headquarters to survive for decades. Sudan provided the haven to bin Laden and his associates from 1991 to 1996, and Afghanistan did the same after their 1996 expulsion from Sudan.
Bin Laden's implication in the 1993 downing of two U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in Somalia and the subsequent firefight that resulted in the deaths of 18 Rangers began Washington's targeting of bin Laden and his organization. The first World Trade Center bombing in 1993; the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers, the U.S. military housing complex in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 boat bombing of the USS Cole in Aden harbor, and the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon culminated in the current war to eliminate bin Laden's Afghan sanctuary and to destroy al Qaeda.
Whatever terrorist remnants survive the current campaign will undoubtedly seek sanctuary. Other anti-American terrorists also require safe harbors. Iraq is the prime suspect for offering such a haven, and Iran, Sudan, and Somalia are also mentioned as prime potential sanctuaries.
There are two essential sets of conditions needed for a sanctuary to exist. The first is a government that is willing to give terrorists protection and the security necessary to allow them to function. Terrorists need to recruit and train members, establish a physical infrastructure, develop financial support, and be able to command and control operations. A protective government must be willing to facilitate these activities either because they are compatible with its own foreign policies or because terrorists can buy protection. In Afghanistan, the Taliban used al Qaeda fighters in its attempt to squash its Northern Alliance enemies and reportedly received millions of dollars in support from bin Laden.
The second set of conditions involves the absence of foreign agents willing to and capable of challenging the terrorist organization and its protectors. This permits the first set of conditions to exist. The protective government must keep out counter-terrorist forces, usually by limiting economic, tourist, media, and diplomatic relations — or even prohibiting all relations, as the Taliban did with the United States. The protective government must also be willing to suffer some measure of isolation, and some level of economic and political sanctions from governments wanting to destroy the terrorist network. The Taliban, grateful for bin Laden's services in the wars against the Soviet Union and Taliban's domestic enemies, accepted these costs.
In practical terms, it is in U.S. interests to make terrorist sanctuaries disappear. After all, terrorism, not hostile states willing and able to take on the United States and its many allies, is the threat du monde. Unfortunately, while many opportunities exist to remove virtually all potential terrorist sanctuaries, numerous obstacles make the task hazardous even for a superpower. Outlined below are the current opportunities for removing terrorist sanctuaries in Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and Somalia, and the many obstacles for doing so.
Iraq
Opportunities
An unidentified U.S. official told the Associated Press on Nov. 23 that American intelligence officials are looking into reports that Saddam Hussein has offered bin Laden and Taliban leaders sanctuary in Iraq. So far, the official said, the information could not be confirmed.
Undoubtedly, Hussein would like nothing better than to get back at the United States and at the Bush family in particular. In 1993 he allegedly plotted to assassinate George H. W. Bush during the former president's trip to Kuwait. But Hussein, though he reportedly harbors dissident Palestinian, Saudi, and Iranian terrorists, has not provided sanctuary to active anti-Western terrorist organizations for a number of years. He has, instead, indicated that Iraq wants to break out of its diplomatic isolation and end UN-imposed economic sanctions. Russia and France, two permanent members of the UN Security Council, support his efforts. Hussein courts Russia and France with pledges that Iraq will repay old loans amounting to billions, expand imports, and award Moscow and Paris lucrative contracts. He has apparently agreed to a Russian plan to allow the return of UN weapons inspectors on the condition that economic sanctions then be lifted, a plan the United States and Britain reject. "Our proposal is still on the table but we have been given to understand that they don't like it," said the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, Sergei Lavrov.
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder also appeared to encourage a shift in Washington's hard-line policies towards Baghdad when he expressed caution about expanding the war on terrorism to Iraq or Somalia. "We should be particularly careful about a discussion about new targets in the Middle East," Schroeder said during a Nov. 28 parliamentary debate, adding: "more could blow up in our faces there than any of us realize."
Arab officials repeated these sentiments. In Cairo, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa told reporters that "striking against any Arab country will be the end of harmony within the international alliance against terrorism."
No American official has been as sensitive to Arab, Muslim, and European opposition to U.S. Iraqi sanctions than Secretary of State Colin Powell. His attempt to obtain UN approval for "smart sanctions" — whereby restrictions on civilian exports to Iraq would be lifted, military exports tightened, and Iraqi oil smuggling restricted — failed in the face of Russian opposition. Moscow wanted most sanctions lifted. [In a compromise reached Nov. 27, the United States and Russia agreed to establish new trade rules by June 1, 2002.] Powell has also said that, so far, no evidence links Saddam Hussein to the terrorist attacks, and has advised President George W. Bush to allow greater Western engagement with Iraq, a theme reinforced by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian leader is leveraging his cooperation on counter-terrorism to secure concessions from Washington, hence the Nov. 27 agreement to revise the UN-mandated trade rules toward Iraq.
Hussein's willingness to engage with Russia, France, and other European states creates the opportunity, if engagement occurs, for these states to insist that Iraq not harbor active terrorist organizations or else face the return of isolation and even tougher sanctions. Hussein, never one to allow independent political operatives in his realm, would likely avoid harboring terrorists while spiting the United States by giving all his country's business to Europeans. In addition, Russian and French agents on the ground in Iraq could make terrorist cells extremely hard to hide.
Obstacles
A host of internal and external forces will make it difficult for Washington to permit Russian and French engagement with Iraq, much less any rapprochement initiated by the United States itself. If anything, hostility towards the Hussein regime is growing and talk of making war on Baghdad is increasing in volume. Overthrowing Hussein and installing a friendly government in Baghdad would indeed deny terrorists a congenial sanctuary, but the obstacle of conducting a war to this end without support from any Arab, Muslim, or European country would be difficult to overcome. But, as one unnamed official told the Washington Post, "If something is a threat to American interests — if we had to act alone, we would."
Attacking Iraq, however, raises the risk that a protracted war would actually wed anti-U.S. terrorists to the defense of Iraq and thus create a sanctuary where one does not now exist. Nevertheless, Bush has escalated his rhetoric against Hussein. Asked what he would do if Saddam Hussein did not allow UN weapons inspectors back in, Bush replied, "he'll find out." As a presidential candidate, Bush pledged to confront the Iraqi dictator far more vigorously than his predecessor. Major segments of his administration, the media, think tanks, and influential lobbyists have pressured Bush to take that road. Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, contends that the mere likelihood that Hussein would use weapons of mass destruction legitimizes U.S. action to destroy his regime. Former CIA director James Woolsey and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz agree. "We have a good bit of evidence — chemical, biological, and even nuclear — that the Iraqis are working both with their indigenous capabilities and acquiring what they can illicitly in the international market," Wolfowitz said during a Nov. 21 briefing. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld tilts in the same direction. If Hussein is "left alone, he is a threat in the region," according to Rumsfeld. Columnists William Safire, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Michael Kelly, Charles Krauthammer, and others all press for Hussein's removal. The Israeli lobby for years has called for decisive U.S. action against the Baghdad regime.
Reversing course in the current political climate and moving towards engagement would be unlikely, even if Bush decides not to attack Iraq. Political subversion would then be the most likely option after the military operation in Afghanistan is concluded.
Further obstacles arise with public opinion. A recent poll found 78 percent of Americans rejecting any engagement with Iraq other than by the use of military force. In a strange twist, Jordan, Turkey, and Syria also oppose Western engagement and the lifting of sanctions because all three of Iraq's neighbors do a thriving smuggling business.
Iraq, therefore, will likely remain an enemy of Washington and a potential refuge for terrorists.
Iran
Opportunities
Iran has the distinction of being home to two governments. One, that of elected President Mohammad Khatami backed by a majority in parliament, has attempted to begin the process of reconciliation with the United States after 22 years of estrangement arising from the 1979 hostage crisis. He invited an American sports team to Teheran in 2000, opened secret talks with American diplomats at the United Nations (even authorizing his delegate there to publicly shake hands with Powell), and has cooperated with the United States in the assault on the Taliban. Facilitating the movement of relief supplies to beleaguered Afghan civilians, sharing intelligence, and pledging assistance in aiding downed U.S. airmen sent clear signals that Khatami seeks engagement with Washington.
Some analysts have speculated that Khatami's softening towards Washington is designed to keep Iran off the U.S. list of future counter-terrorism targets. But Khatami has other reasons for muting his country's traditional anti-Americanism. Not the least of his motives is his effort to deflate his rival government headed by Ayatollah Kameini, a cleric who uses the supposed threat by the U.S. "Great Satan" to demand primary obedience to his rule. Removing that "threat" would weaken the standing of the authoritarian clerical government and bolster the legitimacy of the democratically elected one.
Iran, of course, has its own motives for ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban. Drug traffickers and refugees (now totaling about 1.5 million) have streamed across the Iranian border for years, a direct result of Taliban permissiveness on drugs and its repression of enemies. Teheran also wants fellow Shi'ite Muslims of the Hazara clan in Afghanistan adequately represented in a new Kabul government.
Obstacles
Unlike Iraq, support in Washington for overthrowing the Iranian government(s) remains weak. Thus, besides being immensely difficult, an attack on Teheran would be hard to legitimize.
This does not mean that the restoration of relations is likely. Numerous obstacles exist.
The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, renewed in 2001 for five years, prohibits any significant American oil investments in Iran and contains a mechanism to punish foreign corporations that do so. Iranian hardliners have supported Lebanon's Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and Iran remains on the State Department's list of states sponsoring international terrorism.
Israel and its many friends in Congress strongly support these measures designed to isolate and sanction Iran. U.S. efforts to enlist Iran (and Syria) in its counter-terrorism campaign brought strong Israeli disapproval. "Cooperation with terrorist-sponsoring nations," Israel's public security minister, Uzi Landau, told Defense News, "gives them unwarranted international legitimacy and will complicate our own war against terrorism." Israel also worries about Iran's development of weapons of mass destruction, a view shared by many in the Bush administration. Speaking at a Nov. 19 UN Geneva conference designed to strengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, John Bolton, U.S. undersecretary of state, accused Iran of cheating. Besides Iraq, Bolton said, "we are quite concerned about Iran, which the United States believes probably has produced and weaponized BW (biological weapons) agents in violation of the Convention." Russian sales to Iran of two nuclear reactors, with the first already under construction, have also raised further questions concerning Teheran's production of nuclear weapons.
The inflexible opposition of the clerics is perhaps the major obstacle preventing greater American engagement with Iran, however.
As with Iraq, the opportunities for establishing normal relations with Iran and inserting officials who could detect the presence of terrorist organizations cannot be exploited without high costs. Sanctuaries will likely remain.
Somalia
Opportunities
Since Sept. 11, the president of Somalia's transitional government, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, has voiced persistent support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. With Somalia as one of the most likely U.S. targets following the campaign in Afghanistan, Hassan is seeking to boost the country's official anti-terrorist stance to bolster U.S. diplomatic engagement. Somalia's UN ambassador has also pledged to arrest and hand over any al Qaeda members escaping from Afghanistan.
While there are no indications of immediate U.S. military operations in Somalia, President Bush has given clear signs that Somalia's past involvement with Osama bin Laden makes it a clear target in the global campaign against terrorism. Indeed, the administration has already taken diplomatic and financial measures to cripple terrorist operations in the country. It added a Somali Islamic group, al Itihaad, to its list of foreign terrorist organizations on Sept. 23. On Nov. 7, the Treasury Department ordered a raid of U.S. offices of al Barakaat, a money-wiring and telecommunications company operating largely out of Somalia and suspected of having ties to bin Laden. Anti-terrorist allies around the world have been alerted to freeze assets of the organization.
If and when Washington does decide to take military action, it is likely to rely on neighboring Ethiopia — whose army has been fighting the al Itihaad for at least four years — to make moves on the ground rather than to deploy American troops. Ethiopia has expressed strong willingness to work with the Pentagon as it plans to strike at al Qaeda and al Itihaad networks in Somalia. There have already been allegations that Ethiopian troops have entered the breakaway Somali region of Puntland in the northeast to help the region's ousted leader, Abdullahi Yussuf. In addition, top officials of the British military have reportedly been asked to develop plans for attacks on Somalia. Pentagon officials have acknowledged that U.S. ships have been stationed near the Somalia coast to guard against bin Laden or his associates entering the country by sea.
Analysts project that one early target may be the small island of Ras Komboni, near the Kenyan border. There is evidence that Ras Komboni serves as a base of operations for al Qaeda, and that the organization ships people and supplies to and from Somalia through the island. Whatever strategy — military or diplomatic — the United States may choose if it moves the war onto Somalia, it is likely to receive more cohesive international support than for actions in Iraq or Iran.
Obstacles
As much as the Somali government is attempting to side with the global anti-terrorism coalition, the war-ravaged country remains a likely safe haven for bin Laden and al Qaeda members if they flee Afghanistan. Somalia has been a sanctuary for al Qaeda since 1993, when bin Laden sent several top associates to provide assistance to Mohamed Farah Aideed, whose supporters eventually killed 18 American troops in Somalia. The country was again a center of al Qaeda activity in 1998 as its members plotted the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
Since Sept. 11, intelligence reports have claimed that associates of bin Laden had moved to Somalia after the attacks on the United States. Reports have also claimed that Saddam Hussein is funding the terrorist camps of al Itihaad in Somalia in return for Somali assistance in avoiding UN sanctions imposed on Iraq. This governmental link with Iraq, as well as the close connection between al Itihaad and al Qaeda, provide reasons for moving against Somalia in the war against terrorism.
Given a decade without a central government and the unending internal strife, Somalia is in a state of turmoil that makes it difficult for U.S. intelligence to track terrorist activities there. The U.S. embassy in Mogadishu closed in 1991, and U.S. policy-makers and experts have since lost even basic information on the country's political factions, clans and increasingly radical Islamic groups. Although Abdiqassim is the nominal president, his restricted control does not even cover all of Mogadishu, thus placing a definite limit on his ability to deliver assistance to U.S efforts to crack down on terrorists in the country.
Furthermore, what U.S. military strategies in Somalia can actually achieve remains uncertain. In 1997, Ethiopia dispatched its troops to the western Somali town of Luuq to raid the offices of al Itihaad. In addition to killing hundreds of the Islamic group's militiamen, Ethiopian forces reportedly seized three truckloads of documents detailing the group's link to al Qaeda. The ongoing strikes on al Itihaad have largely destroyed the group's training camps, thus raising questions about the efficacy of any U.S. strikes on the country.
Another concern for Washington is the devastating effect of a U.S. campaign on the Somali people. Somali citizens, many already destitute, have expressed anger and dismay at the U.S. order blocking the asset flows of al Barakaat, which serves as Somalia's largest bank and money remittance company. The breakdown of Somali institutions since the 1991 overthrow of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre have led millions of Somali to rely on al Barakaat as a financial lifeline. With the closing of the company, UN humanitarian representatives forecast a major crisis involving the collapse of the entire Somali economy.
Sudan
Opportunities
Khartoum's involvement with bin Laden in the 1990s is well known. Since bin Laden's expulsion from the country in 1996, however, the Sudanese government has exerted enormous efforts to turnaround the country's image. Hassan al Turabi, the Islamic militant who offered bin Laden sanctuary in Sudan in 1991, has been put under house arrest. President Omar el-Bashir's Islamic government was quick to condemn the Sept. 11 attacks, and offered the United States the use of its military facilities for operations directed against bin Laden. He also claims to have deported 3,000 al Qaeda supporters in recent years, and is now ordering Khartoum's intelligence services to cooperate with the CIA. In a sign of warming relations, the United Nations in September ended sanctions on the movement of diplomatic personnel and government officials that were imposed in 1996 in an effort to coerce Sudan to hand over suspects involved in the assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
Obstacles
As promising as Sudan's official support for the anti-terrorism campaign may be, it nonetheless is a country that has been on the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism since 1993. In stark contrast to the lifting of UN sanctions, Washington in November extended the sanctions against Sudan by one year, stating that the country's actions and policies still pose a significant threat to U.S. national security. Sudan's official support in the war against terrorism has not quelled suspicions by the United States that the country continues to provide safe haven, training facilities and transit points for terrorist groups. U.S. authorities have evidence that Sudan harbors such militant Islamic extremist organizations as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Al Gamaat al Islamiyya, and that it supports other terrorist groups in Algeria, Uganda, Tunisia, Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The disparity between Khartoum's rhetoric and reality thus keeps Sudan a possible target in the U.S. military campaign. Any military action in Sudan is expected to involve precision strikes against individuals identified with the aid of the government.
Conclusion
The four cases examined show that the eradication of sanctuaries in these countries will be an arduous undertaking because of the respective government's ambiguous posture (Iraq and Iran) and limited reach (Somalia and Sudan) in rooting out terrorism. The governments of Somalia and Sudan have expressed unequivocal support for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. The positions and motives of Iraq and Iran are less explicit, and any American action toward these two countries will prove controversial among U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East.
For the two African governments, the attacks of Sept. 11 have provided an opportunity for closer diplomatic relations with the United States. Removing sanctuaries through U.S. military action, if implemented with clear and achievable goals, has the potential of furthering, rather than undermining, their improved relations with Washington. In broadening the counter-terrorism campaign to Iraq and Iran, however, the United States will need to take into account possible reactions from its allies, the intended and unintended impact on the stability of the government — in particular that of Hussein — and the long-term implications for regional and global stability.
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