CDI Terrorism Report:
Al Qaeda Attempts to Widen War

The missile launcher used in recent attacks on Israeli targets in Mombasa, Kenya, has been found to come from the same batch as one used in a failed Qaeda attack on a U.S. warplane in Saudi Arabia last year. This points to bin Laden's organization being responsible for the latest coordinated attacks, in which a surface to air missile (SAM) narrowly missed an Israeli-chartered airliner taking off from Mombasa airport just minutes before suicide bombers struck the city's Paradise Hotel killing 10 Kenyans and three Israelis. If al Qaeda is behind the incidents, it is the first known instance of the group openly targeting Israelis — a move that could mark a widening of the war being waged by the terrorist network. The methods used at Mombasa also further highlight the danger of suicide attacks and the vulnerability of civilian aircraft to man-portable air defense systems — as ubiquitous and as they are easy to use.

In addition to the evidence supplied by the Mombasa missile launcher's serial number, a statement posted on the internet on Dec. 2, from a group calling itself the Political Office of al Qaeda Jihad Organization, claimed responsibility for the attacks. The five-page statement, considered credible by U.S. officials, described the attacks as a Ramadan present to the Palestinian people, saying that: 'At the same place where the "Jewish-Crusader coalition" was hit four years ago, here the fighters came back once again to strike heavily against that evil coalition. But this time it was against Jews." As this reference to the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 231 people, 12 of them Americans, highlights — if al Qaeda is responsible, the latest attack represents a return to old hunting grounds for the group — if indeed it ever left.

 
Widening the war

Initially, a hitherto-unknown Lebanese-based group calling itself The Army of Palestine stated they were responsible for the attacks, which they said marked the 55th anniversary of the UN resolution calling for the division of what was then Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. This claim of responsibility has thus far been discounted in most quarters. There is also little proof of direct links and cooperation between Palestinian groups and al Qaeda, possibly because the Palestinians have been wary of such associations, lest the religious zeal of bin Laden's organization detract from their own nationalistic goals, or incur the military wrath of the United States. However, while some Palestinian groups, such as Hamas, appear to shun internationalizing their conflict with Israel, others, such as Hezbollah, may welcome such a move. Indeed Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah stated in a recent television broadcast that the 'Martyrdom operations — suicide bombings — should be exported outside Palestine,' adding, 'I encourage Palestinians to take suicide bombings world-wide.' There were also reports in the Italian press last August that a Hezbollah member, Al Haji Sayed, was responsible for developing operational ties between the two groups. Such claims notwithstanding, any Qaeda-Hezbollah alliance would be difficult for the latter group to justify to their Syrian sponsors. Such a move would also potentially threaten Hezbollah's strong position within Lebanon's intricate and delicate power structure, and is made more unusual in that, while Hezbollah is Shiite, al Qaeda is Sunni. However, even without an explicit Hezbollah alliance with al Qaeda, any connection of both organizations' respective causes would probably be welcomed by bin Laden, as would any linkage of their military campaigns.

Thus far, bin Laden's organization has not been known to target Israelis specifically, although Israel's Defense Minister, Shaul Mofaz, and the chief of defense forces, Lt. Gen. Moshe Yaalon, both claim that many Qaeda attacks had already been averted within Israel, and that al Qaeda employed Palestinian operatives in Gaza and the West Bank. Nor has al Qaeda previously claimed direct responsibility for terrorist attacks. However, both moves make a certain amount of sense, especially in the context of the latest purported bin Laden missive, which denounced Israeli actions against Palestinians. For any Israeli retaliation for Mombasa may make it more difficult for the United States to enlist moderate Muslims in its fight against al Qaeda. Also, if al Qaeda succeeds in dragging Israeli into the war against it, then it may move a step closer to perpetuating the 'Clash of Civilizations' that bin Laden appears to be seeking. Such a scenario would see the west (and Israel) aligned against Islam and its Qaeda champions. As such, al Qaeda could have sound strategic reasons for attempting to widen the war in this way, even if it means adding as experienced a counter-terrorism operator as Israel to the countries undertaking overt military action against it.

In addition to matching al Qaeda's motives, the Kenya strikes bear hallmarks of one of the organization's operations in that they featured multiple coordinated attacks, were relatively sophisticated, and occurred in a country where the group has been active before and is believed to have retained operatives — in this case cells in Mombasa and Nairobi that are suspected to have been behind the 1998 bombings in Nairobi and Tanzania. Some intelligence sources believe that another organization — Al Itihaad al Islamiya (also known as The Islamic Union) — is behind the Mombasa attacks. Some 2,000-strong, this Somali-based group — also suspected of involvement in the 1993 ambush of American troops in Mogadishu — is the largest and most powerful such organization in the Horn of Africa and makes an ideal Qaeda franchisee. Indeed, to a degree, it is a moot point which specific group executed the latest attacks. The indications are that al Qaeda at least supplied the weapons and inspiration behind the operation, and probably helped plan and coordinate it, even if Qaeda operatives did not actually execute it.

 
Meeting the Evolving Threat

Accurately forecasting such attacks as occurred on Nov. 28 is clearly difficult, and while Germany and Australia issued travel warnings to their citizens in mid-November after enough intelligence 'chatter' was intercepted to point to a potential risk in Mombasa, America and Israel both considered the information they had as too general to warrant any such alert. That an intelligence service as experienced and competent as Israel's could fail to predict such an attack, despite indicators to the contrary, will doubtless alarm their foreign counterparts as much as it consoles them. Additionally, if forecasting such incidents is difficult, preventing them is even trickier.

For instance, the Kenya authorities believe the missiles used in Mombasa, like the bombs used in the 1998 attacks, were smuggled across the border from Somalia. This could indicate a lackluster effort to support the Kenyans in controlling access across what is one of the world's most porous frontiers — a need that America is making increased efforts to fulfill. The process of equipping Kenyan border police with satellite phones has already begun, with speedboats and four-wheel drive vehicles to follow, as the U.S. supplements its more covert operations in the region by providing aid to Kenya. In March, the supplemental U.S. defense budget was passed and included $373 million for counterterrorist financing not only in Kenya but also in Djibouti and Ethiopia. Meanwhile, Germany has been trying to police the area's coastline with low-flying aircraft — part of Berlin's contribution to the on-going war against al Qaeda. How successful such measures are likely to be against a smuggling network that has been in place for hundreds of years remains to be seen — not least as such initiatives make little mention of providing viable alternatives to smuggling in societies where it is a firmly entrenched industry.

In addition, as events in Israel have long shown, effectively defending against suicide bombings is particularly difficult. The Mombasa attacks further highlight the threat posed by such methods, while also raising the specter of SAM strikes against civilian aircraft. This last is not a new possibility. The New York Times reports the FBI -who warned six months ago that such attacks were possible — as stating that at least 29 civilian aircraft have been struck by SAMs (albeit mainly in war zones) at a cost of some 550 lives. That said, the Mombasa attack will heighten fears that such relatively low-tech means will prove as difficult to guard against as more exotic threats such as dirty bombs and anthrax. The Pandora's Box opened by al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001, is proving to be a deep one. Likewise, it is possible that lower-intensity operations such as that at Mombasa may be cover for another 9/11-style 'spectacular.' Moreover, 10 successfully executed Mombassa-type attacks would cause more casualties than Sept. 11 and as much economic damage.

That the SAM used at Mombasa was a relatively inaccurate Soviet-era Strela-2 and missed its target will be a cold comfort with those tasked with guarding civil aviation assets. For while heat-seeking systems such as the Strela can only be fired from behind a target, and can be decoyed by exhaust shroud's, flares, and infrared devices such as those employed by the security forces in Northern Ireland and believed to used by the Israel's El Al airline, such countermeasures are only fitted to military planes in most countries. There are also much deadlier weapon systems available to terrorists such as the newer U.S.-made Stinger, which is considerably harder to decoy. Defending against such weapons via use of 'satellite' patrols around airports is likely to be of limited use, while outfitting civilian aircraft with countermeasures will take both time and money. The U.S. commercial airline fleet comprises around 4,900 aircraft, and it is estimated that individual anti-missile defense systems would cost some $2 million to $3 million apiece.

 
Arrests

Despite allowing the FBI and CIA to take the lead in investigating the 1998 Nairobi embassy bombing, Kenya is thus far heading the investigation into the Mombasa attacks. U.S. and Israeli investigators are on hand, although the latter are said to be concerned at the level of cooperation being extended by the Kenyan authorities. As of Dec. 4, 13 people are being held by Kenyan police in connection with the attacks. Of these, two, described as Kenyans of Arabic origin, were detained over the SAM attack, while another is said to be the owner of the car used in the suicide bombing at the Paradise Hotel and claims to have sold the vehicle to two men of Arab origin. The other 10 suspects were arrested earlier and include at least two Somalis and six holders of Pakistani passports — apparently issued in Mogadishu, although Pakistan has not maintained a diplomatic mission there for a decade.

The latest arrests came as the British High Commission in Kenya evacuated its staff in Nairobi after receiving a threat specific enough to be treated seriously (but not elaborated upon by the British), and as reports emerged in the Australian press that al Qaeda had plotted to attack the 2000 Sydney Olympics using cells from the Indonesian terrorist group Jemmah Islamiah. As these latest reports show, al Qaeda not only has a global reach, but has done so for some time. Furthermore, if, as appears the case, al Qaeda was indeed behind the Nov. 28 attacks in Mombasa, then, since the strikes against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the organization has widened it area of operations from Arlington and New York to encompass Tunisia, Kuwait, the Gulf of Aden, and Indonesia, while also broadening it net of targets to include, for the first time, Israelis. As the year winds to a close, this development provides a salutary reminder that al Qaeda is still active and seeking to drag others into what is effectively a global war.

Selected Sources

'Al Qaeda's Naval and Underwater Capabilities,' Intellibridge Homeland Security Monitor, Dec. 6, 2002.

'Al-Qaeda Suspected in Kenya Attacks,' www.bbcnews.com, Nov. 28, 2002.

'The Threat From Portable Missiles,' www.bbcnews.com, Nov. 29, 2002.

'Three Arrested Over Kenyan Attacks,' www.bbcnews.com, Dec. 4, 2002.

'Three Arrested Over Kenyan Attacks,' www.bbcnews.com, Dec. 4, 2002.

Barker, Mark, 'Al Qaeda Plotted to Attack Games,' The Age (Melbourne, Australia) , Dec. 4, 2002.

Copans, Laurie, 'Terrorism Warning Said Not Specific,' Washington Post, Dec. 4, 2002.

Filkins, Dexter with Lacey, Marc, 'Kenya's Porous Border Lies Open to Arms Smugglers,' New York Times, Dec. 4, 2001.

Gilbert, Nina and Dudkevitch, Margot, 'Israel Foiled Al-Qaeda Plot, Mofaz Reveals,' Jerusalem Post, Dec. 3, 2002.

Maharaj, Davan, 'Kenya Bombing Probe is Stalling,' Los Angeles Times, Dec. 3, 2002.

Martin, Paul, 'Hezbollah Calls for Global Attacks,' Washington Times, Dec. 4, 2002.

McGeary, Johanna, 'The New Realities of Terror,' Time, Dec. 9, 2002.

Opall-Rome, Barbara, 'Israel's Rafael, IAI Join Forces to Protect Civilian Airliners, www.defensenews.com, Dec. 2, 2002.

Shanks, Tom, 'Ideal Terror Weapons: Portable, Deadly, Plentiful Missiles,' New York Times, Nov. 29, 2002.

Sparshott, Jeffrey, 'Missile Shields Urged for Airliners,' Washington Times, Dec. 3, 2002.

Walt, Vivienne, 'Portable Missiles Concern Senators,' USA Today, Dec. 2, 2002.

Mark Burgess CDI Research Analyst mburgess@cdi.org

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